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Taking	unilateral	action	can	improve	a	president’s
re-election	chances,	but	it	may	not	be	good	for	the
country
With	Congressional	gridlock	a	now	omnipresent	force	in	US	politics,	recent	presidents	have	often
turned	to	unilateral	measures,	such	as	executive	orders,	to	enact	policies	without	Congress.	But	is
taking	unilateral	action	good	for	a	president,	and	for	the	country?	In	new	research,	Gleason	Judd
finds	that	as	a	form	of	“showing-off”,	taking	unilateral	action	can	signal	a	president’s	competency	to
voters,	thus	increasing	their	re-election	chances.	The	upshot	of	this,	however,	is	that	presidents	can
often	pursue	unilateral	actions	that	are	good	for	them	politically,	but	are	bad	for	the	country.
Presidents,	in	the	form	of	executive	orders	and	other	forms	of	rulemaking,	have	substantial	unilateral
policymaking	powers	in	the	United	States.	The	Constitution	provides	for	checks	and	balances,	but	presidents
frequently	craft	important	policies	without	substantial	input	from	Congress	or	the	judicial	branch.	On	one	hand,
this	behavior	appears	to	circumvent	the	constitutionally	mandated	division	of	powers	and	enable	the	president	to
excessively	centralize	power.	On	the	other	hand,	as	we	saw	in	the	latter	years	of	the	Obama	administration,
unilateral	executive	powers	can	also	provide	a	tool	for	coherent	and	timely	policy	when	congressional	gridlock
and	polarization	cripple	federal	policymaking.
Should	we	worry	about	unilateral	executive	powers?	Or	should	we	celebrate	them	as	a	way	to	overcome
congressional	squabbling	and	inertia?
In	light	of	these	tradeoffs,	we	want	to	know	whether	political	institutions	can	discipline	politicians	by	allowing	for
unilateral	policymaking	when	it	is	useful,	but	discouraging	harmful	unilateral	action.	Democratic	elections	have
long	been	celebrated	as	a	tool	for	citizens	to	select	the	best	politicians	and	hold	them	accountable.	Yet,	it	is	also
well-known	that	elections	can	encourage	behavior	aimed	at	increasing	a	politician’s	chance	of	reelection	(or
‘office-seeking’),	but	which	also	runs	against	the	public	interest.
Two	contrasting	pieces	of	evidence	suggest	that	presidents	occasionally	do	use	unilateral	action	perversely	for
office-seeking	purposes.	First,	visible	executive	action	is	widely	believed	to	be	important	for	re-election.	Second,
survey	evidence	suggests	that	most	voters	dislike	unilateral	action.	Together,	these	findings	are	puzzling	and
suggest	that	voters	have	an	ambiguous	view	of	unilateral	action.	Consequently,	it	is	unclear	when	elections	are
effective	at	disciplining	unilateral	policymaking.
In	recent	work,	I	study	a	game-theoretic	model	to	investigate	these	questions.	My	analysis	incorporates	both	the
promise	and	downside	of	unilateral	policymaking.	The	promise	of	unilateral	powers	has	two	parts.	First,
officeholders	can	improve	upon	poor	conditions	by	acting	unilaterally.	Second,	unilateral	policymaking	reveals
information	about	the	incumbent’s	capabilities,	helping	voters	to	identify	and	re-elect	high-skill	politicians.	In
contrast,	the	downside	of	unilateral	powers	is	that	officeholders	are	unchecked	if	their	unilateral	action	makes
things	worse.
My	research	finds	find	that	there	are	merits	to	both	sides	of	the	argument	over	unilateral	policymaking.	When
existing	conditions	are	relatively	poor,	the	promise	of	unilateral	policymaking	predominates	because	it	enables
officeholders	to	improve	upon	existing	policies	and	helps	voters	to	identify	skilled	policymakers.
On	the	other	hand,	unilateral	powers	make	voters	worse	off	if	existing	conditions	are	good.	In	this	case,
incumbents	may	act	unilaterally	to	“show	off”	their	policymaking	skill	for	electoral	gain	at	the	expense	of	voters.
My	analysis	shows	how	elections	can	encourage	socially	harmful	executive	orders	even	when	politicians	are	fully
informed	about	the	consequences,	politicians	and	voters	have	identical	policy	preferences,	and	voters	observe
prior	to	the	election	whether	unilateral	action	improves	upon	existing	policy	or	policies	that	are	not	formulated	by
the	executive.
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To	illustrate	with	a	stylized	example,	consider	US	foreign	policy.	Here,	the	president	has	substantial	control	in
practice	and	by	law,	as	developed	in	Article	II	of	the	Constitution	and	in	subsequent	Supreme	Court	rulings.
Presidents	vary	in	their	ability	to	communicate	with	military	leaders,	manage	civil-military	relations,	or	to
determine	the	appropriate	level	of	escalation.	They	also	have	many	unilateral	foreign	policy	instruments	–	such	as
national	security	declarations,	executive	orders	related	to	the	use	of	force,	or	executive	agreements	–	that
demonstrate	their	ability	to	voters,	many	of	whom	are	aware	of	both	international	conditions	and	foreign	policy
decisions	because	these	topics	receive	extensive	media	coverage.	Additionally,	voters	prefer	to	avoid
unnecessary	conflict	and	want	to	elect	effective	politicians.
“President	Trump’s	First	100	Days:	4”	by	The	White	House	is	public	domain.
Choosing	between	the	best	policy	and	re-election
Surprisingly,	electoral	pressures	can	lead	a	president	who	is	highly	skilled	at,	for	example,	military	diplomacy	or
civil-military	relations	to	knowingly	initiate	conflicts	that	make	voters	worse	off.		This	perverse	behavior	does	not
require	the	president	to	have	different	policy	preferences	than	voters	or	lack	information	about	the	consequences
of	unilateral	policy.	It	is	driven	by	an	electoral	bias	in	favor	of	unilateral	policymaking	that	arises	from	strategic
behavior	by	voters.	Even	if	voters	are	not	generally	favorable	of	unilateral	action,	it	can	provide	them	with	useful
information	about	the	officeholder’s	capabilities.	This	bias	is	consistent	with	evidence	that	(i)	voters	have	high
expectations	for	presidential	involvement	in	policymaking	and	(ii)	unilateral	action	is	crucial	for	re-	election.
Thus,	when	existing	conditions	are	good,	incumbents	who	are	skilled	enough	to	win	re-election	after	acting
unilaterally	must	choose	whether	to	continue	to	act	unilaterally	and	win	re-election,	or	continue	with	the	policy
status	quo	and	lose	re-election.	Electoral	considerations	create	the	dilemma	for	elected	executives	that	choosing
the	best	policy	today	may	result	in	losing	re-election.
I	also	find	that	officeholders	are	more	inclined	to	show	off	when	holding	office	is	more	valuable.	This	suggests
that	political	executives	in	more	prestigious	offices,	such	as	presidents	and	governors,	have	stronger	incentives	to
show	off	than	executives	in	less	prestigious	offices,	such	as	mayors.	Motivating	politicians	to	curry	favor	with
voters	can	backfire	and	leave	the	voters	worse	off.
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Viewed	in	a	positive	light,	however,	high-ability	incumbents	are	more	likely	to	be	re-elected	in	prestigious	offices
because	they	are	more	inclined	to	show	off,	despite	the	short-term	policy	costs,	in	order	to	continuing	reaping	the
perks	of	office.	If	holding	office	is	valuable	enough,	then	highly	capable	incumbents	are	always	re-elected,	but
voters	are	worse	off	because	undesirable	unilateral	action	is	more	likely.	In	my	analysis,	the	two	classic
objectives	of	democratic	elections,	disciplining	officeholders	and	selecting	the	best	candidate	for	the	job,	are	at
odds:	bad	behavior	in	office	may	improve	electoral	selection.
A	notable	takeaway	is	that	unilateral	policymaking	is	particularly	important	for	re-	election.	In	practice,	incumbents
who	enact	relatively	high-quality	unilateral	policy	should	be	expected	to	win	re-election	at	higher	rates	than
incumbents	who	achieve	equally	good	outcomes	but	are	less	active	policymakers.
Why	it	can	be	good	for	a	President	to	show	off
My	analysis	also	provides	an	explanation	for	why	officeholders	can	win	re-election	after	unilateral	actions	that
clearly	leave	voters	worse	off.	Survey	evidence	indicates	that	voters	generally	disapprove	of	unilateral	action.
This	public	view	is	puzzling	in	light	of	the	apparent	electoral	benefits	of	unilateral	policymaking	in	practice,	but
consistent	with	the	logic	of	showing	off.	When	conditions	are	good,	incumbents	may	act	unilaterally	to	reveal	their
ability,	even	though	it	leaves	voters	temporarily	worse	off,	and	win	re-	election.	In	these	instances,	the	public
disapproves	of	the	unilateral	action	because	it	makes	current	conditions	worse,	but	they	nonetheless	re-elect	the
incumbent	because	of	her	demonstrated	abilities.	In	practice,	public	opinion	alone	may	not	always	be	a	powerful
weapon	against	undesirable	unilateral	policymaking,	although	it	can	discipline	unilateral	action	by	low-skill
officeholders.
Overall,	context	is	important	for	the	ongoing	debate	about	the	welfare	effects	of	unilateral	presidential	powers.
How	good	are	existing	conditions	or	alternative	policy	prescriptions	from	the	legislative	branch?	If	conditions	are
relatively	good,	how	valuable	is	holding	office?	Unilateral	powers	are	most	problematic	when	conditions	are
relatively	good	and	holding	office	is	valuable.
Given	the	relative	prosperity	of	the	US,	along	with	the	prestige	and	perks	bestowed	upon	governors	and
presidents,	those	who	express	concern	about	excessive	unilateral	policymaking	may	be	justified.	Alternatively,
gridlock	and	polarization	plague	Congress,	possibly	reducing	the	quality	of	the	policies	they	develop,	and
unilateral	executive	powers	are	a	possible	workaround.
This	article	is	based	on	the	paper	‘Showing	Off:	Promise	and	Peril	in	Unilateral	Policymaking’	in	the
Quarterly	Journal	of	Political	Science.
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